(This is a longish research paper published in Vol 26 (pp: 27-98) of Faultlines journal published from Delhi. I am reproducing it on this blog for serious readers/researchers. This paper was written by me in July 2020 and subsequently edited and modified with few additions by Editor of the Journal Mr Ajai Sahni)
It is ironical that it takes a protracted stand-off on the border with China, with the possibility of a military
confrontation, for New Delhi
to realise the gravity of the most complex and
formidable national security threat that
India has faced.
This has been further compounded by internal
governance deficiencies, many of which
stem from colonial legacies.
What most security and strategic experts
– both Indian and Western – often ignore is the fact that
the combined threats from Pakistan
and China are beyond usual neighbourly rivalry
and irritations. They appear driven by a perceived sense of conflict of identity, albeit of different
shades. Both of India’s neighbours
are driven by a superior sense of identity and view its traditionally liberal
and pacifist values
as an opportunity to impose
their aggressive and extractive designs. The very nature of the threats driven by such ideas is so complex
that they are nearly
impossible to avoid, even if they do not always
translate into military
conflagration or war.
Further, India as well as democratic states
in the developing and
developed world must realise that serious deficiencies in democratic governance make a liberal and
transparent society far more difficult
to defend, especially in a globalised
world.
Over the past few decades, Pakistan’s deep state has evolved an unusually emotive
campaign of propaganda against India, as well as an elaborate covert infrastructure of terror and crime to pursue its strategic
objectives. It appears to have done so in a bid to entrench itself,
using its professed
quest for the supremacy of Islam on the subcontinent and beyond, as a convenient pretext. The entire
dynamics has built its own momentum
of radicalisation that is difficult to handle. Several radicalised elements and groups have gone beyond the control of Pakistani state, making the task of
their containment far more difficult. Going by the current trend, at least the next few generations of Pakistanis will
struggle to live in peace not only with a secular, plural India,
but also non-Muslims anywhere. The resultant reactions
will threaten social cohesion on a much larger scale, destroying the
element of social trust which
provides a key foundation for industry, enterprise and initiative.
Going by the cumulative exposures
of Pakistan’s nexus with world-wide
terrorist attacks and terrorist groups, state
institutions all over the world will struggle
to contain the threat from India’s western
neighbour to non-Muslims and even liberal Muslims worldwide. These
associations have already had a spiralling impact on large sections
of people in Pakistan as well. This is despite
the fact that the world is more aware today
about Pakistan’s extensive clandestine and covert
capacities to support and fund Islamist terror and even use global crime syndicates for this purpose. However, global forces,
despite professing strong action
against terrorism, appear helpless in the
face of Islamabad’s machinations and ability to exploit its purported strategic utility for external
powers. There is no let- up in the Pakistani
deep state’s primary
objective to bleed India through increasingly innovative forms of
terror and crime.
Simultaneously, aggressive nationalism in Communist
China – driven by a sense of Han superiority and backed by spectacular economic and technological
transformation – not only legitimises
an opaque and authoritarian regime but also appears to empower it to bulldoze
every opponent at home and abroad.
A
democratic India, with a long civilisational history,
appears a natural
anathema to the Chinese establishment, proud of the country’s long journey as a prosperous, independent and continuously expanding state. China has repeatedly sought to project
itself as a distinctly superior
civilisation to the rest of
mankind, while grudgingly acknowledging the currently
superior strength of the United States. Beijing has not concealed its patronising and arrogant ways in dealing
with India, virtually threatening it through
its state sponsored
media by citing its
substantial dominance in economic and military
terms.
Even otherwise, the rise of a democratic India could potentially threaten the authoritarian
ruling cliques in both China and Pakistan, creating
possibilities of igniting
a domestic clamour for greater rights and liberties.
Hence, while Pakistan may have its
traditional animosity towards India, even China appears to be using several
unscrupulous, deceptive and subversive
strategies, either on its own or through others, to obstruct India’s economic
rise, which could also be a potential threat to Beijing’s hegemony in the region.
India’s defence forces and
diplomatic establishment have, so
far, handled the combined threat from China and Pakistan quite well, aided by the growing world-wide suspicion of China and the exposure of Pakistan’s
connection with terror. But the enormity of this threat has been increasing manifold
in a globalised world, where
trade and technology could be lethal
tools of predation and many of India’s democratic institutions are battling obsolescence and the
entitlement of its political, corporate
and bureaucratic classes.
The expanding asymmetry of
economic and technological power
with China, sustenance of covert war in Kashmir and the continued Pakistani
clout in Afghanistan and beyond, are reflective of sustained
under-performance of certain key institutions
of India. This is notwithstanding certain enclaves of institutional excellence, a highly skilled middle class,
fairly influential Diaspora and
probably the most professional and disciplined
defence forces.
One doesn’t know the extent
to which the
higher echelons of India’s
political-governance establishment have been cognizant of the dynamics
and complexity of the overall
national security challenges. But over the last few decades,
they have struggled to build commensurate strategic-institutional capacities to deal with the
daunting scale of threats challenging India as a state and civilisation. The existing trend has the potential to gradually
deplete the over-all
economic, technological and professional
capacities of the Indian state to address the whole gamut of national security
challenges – driven
by the combined resolve of
two determined geopolitical adversaries – amidst the dysfunctionality of some of its own key institutions, and in a global order that is not entirely
favourable.
Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative for India to explore a paradigm shift in its entire governance
and national security edifice
and outlook to bolster its overall capacities and output. America,
has been part of its own larger
strategy, where India has no role to play.
STRATEGIC PSYCHE AND OUTLOOK OF INDIA AND CHINA
In the context of a speech
by Xi Jinping in 2017, where he had used the term civilisation repeatedly, an eminent Sinologist has emphasised that in recent
years Chinese leaders and thinkers
have been stressing China’s global status and
aspirations in the past, present and the future1. Many such discourses
have involved not only evaluation of their own
outlook and responses over a much longer period of time, but that of others as well. They have often
tried to drive home the point that
China is the only continuous civilisation-state in the entire world, which reflects its resilient and robust
strategic culture. They do acknowledge a few reverses, but tend to blame the ‘Hundred Years of Humiliation’ by
the West to explain their poverty and
constraints in 20th century.
A large number
of Chinese political academics and thinkers have often described India only as a
civilisation and not a state. There
has been emphasis on its political fragility and disunity over most of its history, except
for a brief period in the medieval era when external
occupiers brought a large swath
of the subcontinent under a common rule. They have derived pride in the fact that China has
maintained its cohesion as civilisation
and state, despite all reverses and setbacks. While they seem determined to avenge wrongs done to them during the ‘hundred years of humiliation’, the
perception of a larger culture of political disunity
and fragility in India has indeed shaped their strategic outlook in the region, compounded by their own sense of civilisational and cultural superiority.
1
Alison Kaufman, “China’s
Discourse of Civilization: Visions of Past, Present,
and Future”, The Asan Forum, Volume
8, Number 6, 2020, http:// www.theasanforum.org/chinas-discourse-of-civilization-visions-of-past- present-and-future/.
It is in this context that one should
see the rush to revive
the Confucian idea of
harmony, Sun Tzu’s principles of warfare, to Shang Yang and Han Fei’s codes of governance, besides
the articulation of the
modern Chinese dream. Consistent stoking of
nationalist passion has been backed by successes in poverty alleviation as well as creation of better
access to opportunities at home.
Externally, there is a clear move to influence and shape the world in accordance with the purportedly superior civilisational virtues of China, which
translates into tangible moves towards
strategic domination of Asia and beyond at one level,
and opposition to Western values
and outlook on the
other.
Such an element of national or racial superiority has always been part
of the political psyche of the Chinese state.
This may have had a role in Chinese expansion, subsuming people and their territories who were
described as Nomad in Sima Qian’s Shiji – one of the earliest chronicles
on Chinese history compiled close to
the turn of First Millennium AD. A similar outlook
has continued to manifest in the behaviour and outlook of China’s
leadership from the time of Mao, when it comes
to dealing with the rest of the world. Of
late, there has been repeated Chinese
emphasis on how, from the 1st century AD
until the turn of the 18th century, China had remained the richest country on the planet. China’s
poverty and misery of the 19th and
20th centuries has been blamed on “unequal and exploitative treaties” deceptively imposed
by the West.
In this context, an appeal in the name of avenging
wrongs to the nation not only inspires
younger generation but also influences the global outlook
of sections of China’s communist leadership as well. Simultaneously, it enhances the legitimacy of an unelected regime. Despite some
dissidence, rising prosperity levels,
national power and global prestige helps snuff out dissidence at home. This entire dynamic
virtually exposes the hollowness of the Western
prophecy that democracy
automatically descends with a certain level of
prosperity. Prosperity has, in fact, driven China to influence, shape and dominate the world in accordance
with its own strategic psyche.
India, as a civilisation and state, has been universally perceived as perennially lacking in sound strategic culture over the last millennium or so, especially following the decline
of Gupta empire. This is notwithstanding a few exceptions including Ranjit Singh
and the Marathas
and some other
notable historical figures.
This is, indeed, paradoxical for a state and
civilisation with such rich and formidable history.
China’s own Buddhist monk Fa-Hien or Faxian of the 4th century
CE had described the unparalleled prosperity and social tranquillity of the Gupta Empire of India, which was far larger than its Chinese
counterpart in that era. Even the Western
records now confirm that India as a civilisation had
remained way ahead of all other
ancient civilisations including Rome, Greece, China, Babylon or Mesopotamia or others at one point of time. When master strategist and statesman Kautilya
sought to resurrect India as a civilisation and state as early as the 4th century BC,
it was still bigger than the subsequent Roman, Chinese and other empires, with far stronger economic, military and governance features. Hence, the decadence
and degeneration in strategic culture
would have been of a very high intensity, notwithstanding
efforts to reverse these.
A larger culture of lack of
outward strategic vision as well as
lack of internal political cohesion have been a reality that has troubled India as a state and civilisation for centuries. This is notwithstanding brilliant innovations and initiatives
to the contrary from certain
quarters. The cumulative impact of a deficient strategic culture continues to manifest in India’s half-
hearted efforts to conclude the covert of war from Pakistan as well as the proclivity to ignore the expanding asymmetry of power with China. These are further backed by failure to regulate
domestic political competition and encourage integrity and excellence in institutions, which are critical for national power and a stronger national
security architecture. As a result,
some key institutions of governance, despite their resilience, have struggled to optimise the collective
strength of its people and harness
these towards comprehensive national power.
Stakeholders in independent India have failed to acknowledge the fact that internal
political cohesion – based more on
persuasion and less on oppression – and stronger external strategic outlook supplement each other. Civilisations or political entities
lacking internal cohesion
and stability have
always struggled to build a strong strategic outlook and requisite infrastructure to pursue
strategic goals. This is a vicious trap as internal decay and degeneration become inevitable if a state
or ruling establishment fails to appreciate and prepare for the challenges posed by its geo-political environment. This is what
explains India’s vulnerability to even non-state
entities in the past, resulting in its external
occupation and colonisation, despite
its exceptional material prosperity.
Post-independent India, despite being the world’s
biggest democracy, has continued to display serious
lack of a comprehensive and pragmatic national
security outlook. It has struggled to devise dynamic,
consistent, suitable and sustainable strategies to pursue some of its core security
interests. India apparently sacrificed its strategic interests in Tibet and Eastern Turkistan in deference to China’s goodwill.
Whereas China promptly violated the trust and entered 110 kilometres inside the existing
Sino-Indian border in the Aksai-
Chin sector, which was the only point through which an all- weather road could be built to link
China’s recent acquisitions like
Tibet and Xinjiang2. The association of both
these regions with China has been nominal and fairly recent,
with people of both the places being mentioned as
Nomads and Tribes in Chinese history.
In fact, as a civilisation, India had a much
stronger footprint in both the regions, with the Tibetan script being similar to Devnagri, and Hindustani being a more familiar language than Mandarin in Kashgar.
It is intriguing that the British
archives mention that once they had
almost settled British India’s boundary with China in 1897, with the Chinese accepting the Ardagh-Johnson Line, but they suddenly developed an interest in
Aksai Chin at the instigation of
Russians after two years and reneged in 1899.3 Interestingly, a
Peking University map of 1928 had clearly acknowledged the whole of Aksai Chin as part of India
as per the 1840 Treaty of Chushul
and the Shimla Convention of 1913. Even with Tibet, their nominal
association of 192 years had
terminated in 1912, but Maoist China completely overwhelmed the region by 1959, after continuous coercion from 1950 and forcing a 17-point Agreement
on the Dalai Lama in 1951.4
The first generation of
independent India’s leaders were agitators
and freedom fighters, driven by a sense of idealism. They lacked any meaningful exposure to geostrategy and
2
Jitendra Kumar Ojha,
“Border Stand-Off: Handle the Crises But Build a Strategic Capacity”, Democracy,
Geopolitics And National Security, May 23,
2020, https://www.democracyandgovernance.com/2020/05/recurrent- sino-india-border-standoff.html.
3 3. Ibid.
4 4. Ibid.
geopolitics, and pursued
colonial style decision
making, distrusting military-security institutions. They preferred
building a bridge of friendship with fellow Asian countries rather than to act with foresight. In 2019, the state-owned TV channel Doordarshan brought out a
rare video footage of probably the
last media interview that the first Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, had given (May 18, 1964), barely a week before he passed away
on May 27, 1964. Speaking
with American TV host Arnold Michaelis, Pandit Nehru spelt out the both governance constraints of the
nascent and yet the biggest democracy
of the world as well as the serious security
threats it was facing from both China and Pakistan.5
He appeared particularly
disappointed at the manner in which
China had betrayed his trust, responding with contempt to all gestures of goodwill like support on Tibet and Taiwan and a seat at UN Security Council, among
others. He noted that China was driven by a sense of racial
and civilisational arrogance, treating
everyone else, including
India, as “uncivilised”, or even barbaric, despite
the fact that they were poorer than India.6 China’s aspiration for regional, or even a wider, hegemony was amply evident even
at that point of time. It has only become more amplified with the rising economic and military prowess
of China following fruition of Deng
Xiaoping’s modernisation programmes focusing on Agriculture, Industry, Defence
and Science & Technology.
Pandit Nehru also mentioned what
the world had known all along, how the
Jinnah-led Muslim League, acting at the behest
of colonial Britain, had opposed India’s independence, and orchestrated the partition of the country,
involving the worst genocide and carnage in human history. The West was extremely ambivalent on the issue and supported Pakistan, disregarding reality, only to pursue its own strategic interest of containing Soviet Russia during the Cold War. In many Western academic and social quarters there has often been an attempt to equate India and Pakistan by describing India as a Hindu-dominated state and Pakistan as a Muslim majority state, ignoring differences in the basic character and outlook of the two states. Even now there is very little mention of the fact that non-Muslims, who constituted more than 1/3rd of the total population of territories that are part of Pakistan, were almost completely wiped out from both parts of Pakistan, even as the Muslim population of independent India continues to grow.
5
Prasar Bharati
Archives, “Jawaharlal Nehru’s
last TV Interview – May 1964”, May 14, 2019, YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=zlTfXWFQYGQ.
6 6. Ibid.
India had conceded the most
fertile land to Pakistan and accepted far larger number of refugees,
nearly 15 million
compared to the 0.35 million
who left India.7 With an oversized army, access to far more resources per
capita and almost no national vision
or character of its own, the newly created state of Pakistan soon saw a new ruling establishment that started re-shaping its identity in terms of hatred towards India and made Kashmir a permanent bone of
contention. India was reluctant to
interfere in Kashmir until the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession to protect his people from a Pakistani military-sponsored ‘tribal invasion’. In fact, ever since the call
for ‘Direct Action’ by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1946, a section of Muslims
of the subcontinent, most of whom are now in Pakistan, have rationalised assaults
on Hindus and India. Of course, there has been reaction on
the other side as well, but there is
no comparison with structural domestic atrocities against minorities in, and the global support
structure of Islamist
terrorism that has flowed out of, Pakistan.
7
William Henderson, “The Refugees in India and Pakistan”, Journal of International Affairs, Volume 7, Number
1, 1953, pp. 57-65.
Interestingly, Prime Minister Nehru had recommended that the solution to these twin challenges was to make India internally stronger to face these
effectively. There is no doubt that
there has been substantial progress in this direction since then. But given the enormity of internal
challenges as well as the magnitude of the twin threats, the progress towards building a reliable national security
architecture has not been optimal. The
primary impediment has been the lack of a wider culture of strategic and leadership-driven initiatives at political- bureaucratic levels in pursuit of a
stronger and sustainable national security
architecture. Such an architecture would need to be able to handle
and even eliminate all shades of combined and diffuse threats from both Pakistan
and China, without dislocating its strategic development and national consolidation goals. The professional skills
and motivational levels
of India’s defence forces have been universally
acknowledged. The real challenge lies
in building a strong ecosystem of economic prosperity, technological innovation, high quality
human resources, dynamic
and effective institutions, and a wider
culture of leadership and excellence. Breaking the existing inertia will not be easy, but this is the challenge
history presents to any visionary and determined
leadership.
ANATOMY OF THE CHINESE THREAT
The Chinese threat to India’s
national security has always been fairly comprehensive, strategic
and nearly inevitable unless India becomes militarily and economically stronger. If China peacefully co-existed with India as
a civilisation in the ancient era, it
was largely due to India’s stronger economic
and military capacity and its reluctance to militarily expand towards China. China as a state and
civilisation has many strengths, but
it has demonstrated a penchant to dominate all
powers and civilisations that appear vulnerable and weaker.
There has been an element of remarkable consistency in
this notwithstanding its paternalistic political structure and political psyche, often inviting its own downfall
and disaster at regular intervals.
Today, China has acquired the
capacity to dislocate both long-term and short-term economic
and security interests of India and it has not concealed its intent to do so under favourable circumstances. Such indicators are not confined
to the border dispute, military support to Pakistan, opposition to Indian moves to curb Pakistani
terrorist groups, blocking India’s
entry into institutions like Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), creation of strategic bases in the Indian Ocean, or aggressive wooing of smaller neighbours of
India in South Asia. China has
struggled even to conceal its contempt even for
the West, given their relatively shorter history, but it has been particularly aggressive towards India both during its early
years after the Communist Revolution, as well as in the aftermath of its spectacular economic transformation. There has been repeated emphasis at every level
on the distinctly superior economic
and military capacity
of China compared
to India. Its global power ambitions are not merely manifest in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or
securing its strategic influence and
domination in the Far-East, Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean, nearly the whole of Africa, barring
a few states, Central Asia, and parts of West Asia. Notwithstanding recent
statement of Chinese Foreign
Minister, Wang Yi that his country had “no
intention of challenging the United States or replacing it or entering into total confrontation with
it,”8 this is inevitable given the internal political dynamics of China.
Of course, it will be careful under normal circumstances to avoid total confrontation that could be detrimental to the Chinese regime as well as the Chinese state or its domain of influence.
8
Christian Shepherd,
“China says ties with US at lowest point since 1979”, Financial Times, July 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/cb2aab03-8a77- 49fd-a928-b470948bebdf.
But the very Confucian ideal driving the
Chinese leadership, has a strange
notion of enduring
harmony, envisaging domination of the powerful and
submission of the rest as its foundation.
China has made its intent to dominate the entire world absolutely clear, despite the acceptance that it is no position
to achieve this goal at this juncture. The United States
remains formidable as of now and hence
a direct confrontation would be avoided. However, it has been clear that China has become extremely powerful in whole of
Afro-Asian region, where it has even
tested the resolve of the United States with
its stance on the South China Sea. It can accept some degree of US
presence but it perceives its right to dominate and control the region as unquestionable. It would not like anyone
to upset or disturb such calculation and India
appears a potential threat in this direction. Simultaneously, it is also clear that India is in no position to challenge the Chinese
domination of the region on its own.
It has to do so with the backing of the western powers, especially the United States,
which has been promoting a greater
role for India in the whole of Indo-Pacific region.
China has the baggage of its
dispute with India, which ranges from grudges like India’s hospitality to the Dalai Lama
to so called territorial claims. Support to terror breeder Pakistan,
despite the vulnerability of its own soft underbelly of Uyghuristan (Xinjiang) to Islamic radicalism, has to be seen in this
context. Going by the psyche of the Chinese leadership, China could deploy every possible means to wage modern hybrid and multi-faceted irregular war,
while avoiding large- scale damage
to its own strengths, to ensure that India did not threaten
Beijing’s larger objectives. Given their larger
ways of working, India has to remain extremely careful
about subversion of its own institutions as well as indirect threats from Pakistan among others.
For India, a strained relationship
with China has been a longstanding reality
following the 1962 War, and China’s proximity with Pakistan. Following
the much-talked-about meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv
Gandhi in 1988, there had been considerable advancement in confidence building measures and the two sides have managed to improve economic relations, though these have
remained unfavourable to India. A
suitable response would lie, not merely in blaming China, though this may be part of building psychological pressure to exact some concessions. But strategic policy makers
and stakeholders in India have ignored the widening economic, industrial and technological gap between the two countries, especially since the
turn of this century.
If some retired senior Indian
diplomats are highlighting that China
no longer talks of Sino-India partnership in the 21st century in the
same way it did earlier, it is because they see a larger tectonic shift in geopolitical realities. China has become far stronger in Asia and Africa,
creating an exceptional model of
strategic, economic and military domination. Its economic power is supplementing its military
capacities and vice-versa. It has
captured the space of a superpower ceded by Soviet Russia in a somewhat different and more sustainable way. At the same
time, India has been reduced to an economic and technological minnow. Hence, over the last 8 to 10 years, China has been consistently violating all
confidence building measures, even on
the border, which had been decided on earlier. This is part of a larger strategy
to subdue India,
to snuff out any possibility of direct or indirect
challenge to China’s domination of
the region. Its aggression in the South and East China Seas, stronger
economic and strategic presence in the Far East, Indian Ocean, Africa, Central Asia and even South America, has been part of its own larger strategy, where India has no role to play.
RECENT BORDER STANDOFF
By mid-July 2020, India and China
were still negotiating the de-escalation of the worst border skirmishes since the 1967 border
clashes near Nathu La. Though China has concealed the actual number of its casualties, all reliable indicators
have confirmed that these are substantially higher
than those on the Indian side. Nevertheless, Beijing appears reluctant
to withdraw entirely and
restore the status-quo ante, and has, indeed,
extended its intrusions to several other areas. Indian experts assess that the mutual withdrawal from the point of scuffle near Galwan River or fingers area
of Pangong Tso Lake or Hot Springs
amounts to Line of Actual Control being pushed
in by a few kilometres on the Indian side. The Indian government has given the assurance that this arrangement is only temporary and would not have a permanent impact
on the actual border between the two countries.
However, what is worrying is the clear
spurt in total
number of Chinese incursions
into the Indian side of the border since 2012-13,
as projected by the following table:
|
Chinese transgressions
|
|
Year
|
West
|
East
|
Middle
|
Total
|
|
2020
|
130
|
30
|
10
|
170
|
|
2019
|
110
|
70
|
7
|
187
|
|
Figures Jan to April
|
|
Aerial transgressions
|
|
Year
|
West
|
East
|
Middle
|
Total
|
|
2019
|
32
|
64
|
12
|
108
|
|
2018
|
31
|
42
|
5
|
78
|
|
2017
|
27
|
4
|
2
|
23
|
|
2016
|
17
|
4
|
2
|
23
|
|
2015
|
19
|
0
|
1
|
20
|
India-China
border: Chinese transgressions, aerial transgressions9
Another study had compiled
data from 2003 onwards, which showed a somewhat sudden increase
in such border transgressions by the
Chinese from 2012 onwards.10 There were
16 transgressions between 2012 and 2014, compared to 14 over the preceding 10 years. The table above only indicates
that such a trend has not merely sustained since 2012, but has built a momentum
of its own. This is not possible
without a well-planned
strategic calculus on the part of the Chinese
establishment.
It is also difficult to believe that the July 2020 border
stand- off was unplanned.
Such massive mobilisation at a time when the entire
world had been
battling the Wuhan
virus (COVID-19) for which most countries have held China responsible – is not possible without adequate preparation. Perhaps the mounting global pressure on the Communist regime for concealing vital information about the disease was a trigger point, forcing moves aimed at deflecting criticism. But the Chinese resolve to browbeat India appears to be part of a wider and consistent strategy. This was amply manifested even during the Doklam crisis, which was completely unprovoked, and in the opinion of many security analysts, aimed at conveying a message to Bhutan that India was in no position to guarantee the security of its borders. However, a tough stance by the Indian Army eventually repelled the Chinese.
9
Sushant Singh,
“What does the increase in Chinese transgressions mean?”, The Indian Express, June 16, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/ explained/chinese-transgressions-ladakh-line-of-actual-control-6421855/.
10 Mihir Bhonsale,
“Understanding Sino-Indian border issues: An analysis of incidents reported in the Indian media”, ORF Occasional Paper, February 2018,
https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ORF_Occas ional_Paper_143_India-China.pdf.
Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s
recent utterances and his efforts
to create an artificial boundary dispute with India11 has to be seen in the context
of rising covert
capacity of the Chinese state to influence and manipulate fragile and smaller
states. The very
possibility and space for exercise
of such covert
influence by China in
India’s own backyard is extremely worrying for
the latter’s national
security interests.
Following the abolition of the
special status of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir, the Global Times, a
mouthpiece of the Chinese Government,
had threatened in an August 12, 2019, editorial, that India would incur risks over such a move. It had termed the Indian government’s
decision to partition the state into two union
territories as “reckless, provocative… and unilateral,” and one that had “broken
the status quo on the border, challenging the interests of
India’s neighbours.” Cautioning that the decision could impact the regional situation,
it had warned
that “opposition of Pakistan and Muslims in India-controlled Kashmir may have actual consequences. If the Muslims collectively oppose India’s move, it is hard for India’s system to control the situation. We do not see that India has the political and other resources to fully take over the area.”12
11
Nayanima Basu, “Oli
now says India has ‘encroached’ Nepal’s territory since 1962, should return it”, The Print, June 10, 2020, https://theprint. in/diplomacy/oli-now-says-india-has-encroached-nepals-territory-since- 1962-should-return-it/439344/.
12 “Unilateral move will incur risks for India”, Global Times, August 12, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161227.shtml.
1
Given the Chinese support
to Pakistan’s efforts
to internationalise the
situation, many Indian observers believe that
China had probably started planning aggression in the Ladakh sector since Delhi’s moves on Jammu & Kashmir
on August 5, 2019. What is interesting is that the report also accused the West of “conniving with India,
when China was busy at the trade war
and the Belt and Road Initiative.” The editorial
went on to caution India, warning that New Delhi “needed a friendly neighbourhood in its own interest.”13
Some experts on China have dismissed such rants in Global Times as
pieces of propaganda warfare. But others
believe, and quite logically, that even such
propaganda offers a valuable insight
into the thinking of the Chinese leadership, who rarely speak their mind publicly and often use party-controlled media
to vent. All reports and writings on such important issues are cleared at an appropriate level by the
Chinese Communist Party, whose
functionaries ensure consistency, if not identity, with the party line.
At the height of 2020 border
stand-off, Global Times used somewhat intimidatory language to assert
Chinese supremacy in the region, even
as it appeared wary of the growing US support for a greater
Indian role in the Indo-Pacific region:
...in recent years, favourable
opinion toward China has rarely
been heard from India, but voices that cater to the values-based alliance and the Indo-Pacific Strategy are becoming louder. Can these provide strong strategic support to India’s desire to rise? These concepts dominated by the US implicitly target China, and Washington needs a country like India to spearhead attacks on China…14
13 Ibid.
14 “Border peace basis for healthy China-India ties”, Global Times, June 17, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191967.shtml.
If New Delhi is obsessed with
playing such a role, it is giving up
on itself rather would do everything possible to dominate the world,
than being strategically active. It will turn itself into a tool of the so-called
value alliance, abandoning its ambition
of being an independent big country.15
Another such editorial openly
sneered at any suggestion of possible economic and political
competition or rivalry with India. Emphasising its comprehensive superiority, it asserted:
…some Indian people mistakenly
believe their country’s military is
more powerful than China’s. These misperceptions affect the rationality of Indian opinion and add pressure to India’s China policy…the gap between
China’s and India’s strength is clear. China
does not want to turn border issues
with India into a
confrontation. This is goodwill and restraint from China. But China is confident in the situation at the border. It does not and will not create conflicts,
but it fears no conflicts either. This policy is supported by both morality
and strength.16
While the eventual outcome of the
border dis-engagement talks, as well as the sustainability of the understanding reached, remain
uncertain, a careful analysis of such media reports and other gestures of the Chinese
leadership reflect their significant trust
in: a) the capacity of the Pakistani
state machinery, or
15 15. Ibid;
16 16. “India needs to rid
two misjudgements on border situation”, Global
Times, June 17, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191846.shtml.
Pakistani deep state,
to engage and at least
harass India through
non-conventional and asymmetrical
strategies; b) possibility of Indian Muslims
in Kashmir aligning
with the agenda
of the Pakistani state in the
region; c) possibility of large scale disaffection of Indian Muslims
against the Indian state, possibly through the covert strategic
designs of the Pakistani deep state, translating into serious pressure
on the Indian state; d)
deficiencies of India’s political and administrative institutions in handling
such internal and external pressure;
e) combined strength
of China and Pakistan, supplemented by other smaller states in the region, to impede and obstruct the optimal rise of India as a major power;
and f) China’s own ability
to manoeuvre the entire geopolitical context in its own favour, given its superior technological, economic and institutional prowess.
There may be some element of
substance in China’s self- belief, but the prevailing geopolitical equations are not as simple
as they appear. China has spread itself far too much, both economically and politically, and the consequences of any increased confrontation may be far too high for both sides, as the differences in economic
capacities do not necessarily translate
into proportionate differences in military capacities and strategies. Beyond a certain point, outcomes may depend upon the ability of the two sides to
absorb and recover from shocks. In
the prevailing geopolitical and strategic calculus, India has its own strengths, despite the vulnerabilities ascribed by the Chinese strategists.
However, this does not eliminate the importance of a stronger geostrategic approach and building suitable
capacities through internal
reforms. Simultaneously, India needs to factor in the possibility that dictators and
irresponsible power-driven oligarchs never act with rationality. The Chinese system lacks adequate checks and balances, with few people in a position to question Xi-Jinping. He is vulnerable to more political miscalculations and security risks, which can eventually prove self-destructive for China as well. The apparent softening of the Chinese position on the Indian border and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s conciliatory tone towards the United States, especially after the latter’s tough stance on the South China Sea amidst a chorus of protest from regional powers, reflects an element of caution, though it could simply be a tactical retreat.
DECODING CHINA’S STRATEGIC- MILITARY CALCULUS
A careful analysis of the thrust
of China’s modernisation programmes,
its BRI, its footprints in resource rich pockets of Africa, Central Asia, West Asia, the Far East and even South America,
or its domination of critical
sea routes, capture
of the South China Sea or
domination of the East China Sea, or securing
somewhat monopolistic access to large resources all over the world, among others, indicate a stronger capacity and intent to: a) strongly defend
itself from any possible aggression;
b) dominate large part of the region
and possibly keep even the United
States at bay, or at least substantially enhance the cost of their intervention in the region;
c) secure access
to resources, markets, bases for strategic and
economic domination; d) lock up
global resources for itself and deny similar access and opportunities to others; e) maintain a close nexus between its economic
agenda and military
capacity, backing these through technological innovation.
Since the time when communism was
collapsing in the Soviet Union and
other East European countries, China has been
further strengthening its internal security regime. This could possibly
have been aimed
at denying any space for covert CIA operations to destabilise communist nations. The ruthless suppression at Tiananmen Square was followed by moves to placate people at one end and strengthen military and other security capacities on the other. A careful look suggests that the Communist regime may have become more entrenched internally and is fairly strong in its own backyard. However, it is amply clear that it is in no position to threaten the United States, militarily or in terms of stronger infrastructure for technological innovation, at least in the foreseeable future.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) had reported a small rise
in China’s nuclear
warheads to 320 in 2020,17 which is well beyond the threshold of minimum credible deterrence. What is significant
is the large number of reports in the
open domain indicating consistent improvement
in its credible deterrent capacity and simultaneous advancement in its missile technology, capable of carrying
nuclear payloads. From the mid-1990s China’s
military modernisation programme gained a strong
momentum. A RAND corporation paper,18 that assessed China’s military modernisation
over 1996-2017, has certain
significant observations suggesting rapid strides by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. An analysis
of these inputs
together with other available information in the open domain suggests
following:
China has managed to bridge
significant gaps to enhance the cost and risk of any American military
attack on China,
the East Asia region, including Japan, Philippines, Taiwan
or South China or Chinese
territory, either from its ground
17
“Nuclear weapon modernization continues
but the outlook for arms control is bleak”, SIPRI, June 15, 2020, https://www.sipri.org/media/press- release/2020/nuclear-weapon-modernization-continues-outlook-arms- control-bleak-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now.
18
“An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military
Scorecard”, RAND Corporation,
September 14, 2015, https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us- china-scorecard.html.
bases in the Far East or even US aircraft Carrier
Strike Groups (CSGs).19
PLA has built a large inventory of
(over 1400) advanced short (less than
1000 km) to intermediate (1000 to 3000 km) range ballistic and cruise missiles,
with much greater
accuracy that threaten
forward US air bases in Japan and potential naval
deployments in the region. For example, the Hypersonic DF- 17 missile with a range of 1800 to 2500
kilometres is assessed to have high-precision strike capability that can counter
adversary missile defences by its higher manoeuvrability and lower-altitude flight, which are difficult
to detect and counter. US officials
assess that, during 2008-2018, China conducted
20 times more hypersonic weapons’ tests compared to the United States.20
During its National Day parade in
2019 (October 1) China exhibited an exceptional number of new high-tech weapons
of diverse range, which accounted for 40 per cent of the total weapons showcased. These sought to
demonstrate China’s technological superiority in information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and conventional precision strike capabilities. Some of these weapon systems
appeared capable of disrupting US
communication and information networks, disrupting
US situational awareness and precision targeting, and exposing US and allied forces in the Asia-Pacific to threat from manoeuvring munitions that
challenged the existing US air and
missile defences. A stronger underwater surveillance capacity appeared capable
of threatening the dominance of US submarines in the region.21
19
Ibid.
20 Ibid
21. 21
Ian Williams, “More
Than Missiles: China Previews its New Way of
War”, CSIS Brief, October 16,
2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/more- missiles-china-previews-its-new-way-war.
Some experts assess that China’s newer conventional capabilities, along with several
new or upgraded nuclear delivery systems, mobile Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs) appeared aimed at enhancing the
survivability and penetration capacity
of China’s nuclear forces. Moreover, the technical sophistication and modernity of China’s strategic missile force, a central consideration in Chinese
nuclear decision-making, reflected
Chinese aspiration to supplant the United States as the leading
military and technological power in the Asia-Pacific region. Concerns persist over the dual-capability of China’s medium-range systems. China’s DF-26, for
example, has both conventional and
nuclear variants, and similar uncertainties persist
over the nuclear capability of China’s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) programs.22
Despite induction of newer SEAD
(suppression of enemy air defences)
stealth aircraft, the ability of the US Air Force to penetrate and strike targets opposite
Taiwan with minimal
risk had significantly
declined. This is largely due to substantial
improvement in China’s
integrated air defence
system (IADS), with the induction of newer missiles
with more sophisticated seekers
and ranges of up to 200 kilometres, combined
with more sophisticated fighter aircraft and the
addition of new airborne warning and
control system–equipped aircraft. However, the
US capacity remained robust in the case of the Spratly Islands due to the much smaller target area and
its proximity to the coast.
With the development of new
generations and larger and more
varied inventory of all-weather precision weapons with longer ranges deployable from a growing variety of platforms, and hitting targets
from hundreds of kilometres, the US Air Force can attack more targets and even virtually shut most Chinese airbases around Spratly Island and South China Sea, if it deploys one or more of its aircraft carriers in the area. However, such weapon systems are finite and in case a conflict prolongs, this advantage would be mitigated.
22 Ibid.
With its increasingly credible and
robust over-the-horizon (OTH)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to detect precise
input about any movement in waters beyond
2000 kilometres from the Chinese
coastline, China has achieved approximate capacity to deter anti-surface attacks
by the United States. China has developed the first ever anti- ship ballistic missiles – the first ever
weapon system of their kind – posing
an unexpected threat for US naval deployments
in waters close to Chinese territory. Details of this missile system are not known nor is there any
input available in the open media
about any weapon system developed to counter
these by Americans. There has been massive expansion of the Chinese
Navy and, as on March 9, 2020, they have deployed a 76-submarine fleet, many of which are
believed to be armed with cruise missiles as well as torpedoes. A RAND assessment suggested that their effectiveness (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve
against carriers) has risen
significantly.23 Nevertheless, many independent observers have maintained that the capacity of most Chinese submarines to sustain longer voyages on their own
is suspect. They are in no position
to threaten US amphibious superiority in general but their existing capacity is strong enough to threaten US Naval deployment
close to their own shores.
23
Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up”, National
Defence, March 9, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine. org/articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vsdragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies- stack-up.
Despite the decline in US capability against Chinese amphibious forces, with a combination of submarine, air, and
surface attacks, the US still enjoys clear superiority over Chinese
amphibious forces and their ability
to conduct or sustain
an amphibious invasion, especially beyond Chinese waters.
In the eventuality of a counter-space
conflict, China has fairly strong
defensive capabilities. It may not be in a position to dazzle or obstruct American satellites away from its own territories, but it can certainly protect
its own territory from observation by other satellites.24
These observations suggest that China has succeeded in building what appears to be a near
impregnable shield of protection for
itself through defensive and localised offensive capacities. It is clear, however, that at this stage, instead of threatening America, China is keener to protect its own territory, deter any US attack on China,
and to dominate the East China Sea and South China Sea by making any American military adventure extremely risky and
expensive. However, the net consequences of a full-blown US-China conflict would
be extremely dangerous
and the real efficacy of Chinese weapons would be known only then. What is
apparent at this stage is that China’s
military capacity has become strong
enough to dominate
Asia, but it is still in no position to threaten or compete
with United States globally.
The following table compares
relative numbers of different military variables of India, China, Pakistan
and the United States:
24
Missile Defense Project, “DF-17”,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 19, 2020,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/.
|
MILITARY
VARIABLE
|
INDIA
|
CHINA
|
PAKISTAN
|
UNITED
STATES
|
|
ACTIVE TROOPS
|
2140000
|
2300000
|
653000
|
1281900
|
|
RESERVE
TROOPS
|
11550000
|
8000000
|
513000
|
8111000
|
|
TANKS
|
4427
|
7760
|
2735
|
6393
|
|
ARMOURED
VEHICLES
|
5681
|
6000
|
3066
|
41760
|
|
ARTILLERY
|
5067
|
9726
|
3745
|
3269
|
|
SELF PROPELLED
ARTILLERY
|
290
|
1710
|
325
|
950
|
|
ROCKET ARTILLERY
|
292
|
1770
|
134
|
1197
|
|
TOTAL AIRCRAFTS
|
2216
|
4182
|
1143
|
12304
|
|
FIGHTER AIRCRAFTS
|
323
|
1150
|
186
|
457
|
|
MULTI-ROLE
AIRCRAFTS
|
329
|
629
|
225
|
2192
|
|
ATTACK AIRCRAFTS
|
220
|
270
|
90
|
587
|
|
HELICOPTERS
|
750
|
1170
|
323
|
4889
|
|
TOTAL NAVAL
VESSELS
|
214
|
780
|
Not Known
|
437
|
|
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
|
02
|
02
|
0
|
20
|
|
DESTROYERS
|
11
|
36
|
0
|
20
|
|
FRIGATES
|
15
|
54
|
9
|
0
|
|
CORVETTES
|
24
|
42
|
0
|
0
|
|
SUBMARINES
|
15
|
76
|
15
|
71
|
Source: Compare
Armed Forces25
The relative numbers do not
necessarily translate into real time
war-winning capacities. While all out military conflict at any level would have serious
consequences for all concerned, Indian defence
forces have advantages beyond what these
numbers may suggest.
They have far more improvised and
25
“Compare armed forces”, accessed on July 16, 2020, https://armedforces. eu/compare/country.
reliable weapon systems
compared to both the Chinese
and Pakistanis. They are the only major defence force with combinations of the best improvised weapon
systems from American, Russian,
Israeli and indigenous inventories. The Indian Navy has superior
experience and is fairly strong within
the Indian Ocean where they would be operating closer to the shore. Many experienced observers have conveyed
that, notwithstanding its strengths on paper, China’s military technology has several snags.
Even their fast-expanding Naval system is believed to be facing severe constraints. Naval experts describe
their two naval carriers as nothing more than
show pieces and their submarines as incapable of sustaining themselves for long durations
in the ocean. They may be strong in the South and East China Seas,
but they are certainly vulnerable in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
STRATEGY OF GLOBAL DOMINATION
A closer look at China’s moves,
especially over the past two decades, suggests
that they are going by the traditional military strategies
of domination of critical locations at land, sea, air and now space, with the backing of significant technological innovations. Incorporation of cyber and biotechnological elements in the overall military arsenal remains a possibility given their secretive
approach. They are also building
stronger and sustainable economic capacities to back their strategic and military designs,
which in many cases involve
grave human costs for people
outside China, by unethical exaction
or even plunder
of their resources. This suggests that China is not content
with building a stronger defensive
security cover itself, but is
in the process of building strong pockets of
economic, military and strategic domination around the world,
which would constrict choices of other states and people and eventually threaten global stability.
A
recent Foreign Policy commentary observed, “The conventional wisdom was that China would
seek an expanded regional role – and a reduced
U.S. role – but would defer to the distant future any global ambitions.
Now, however, the signs that China
is gearing up to contest
America’s global leadership are unmistakable, and they are ubiquitous.”26
While China is in no position
to challenge America
militarily or economically on a global scale, its increasing capacities, approach and strategic psyche force an inference of strong intent. Its efforts to build
logistical bases, dominate and
control crucial waterways way beyond its shores or build pockets of influence
by supporting tyrants
and autocrats, use coercive strategies against every
possible adversary and opponent,
especially in the context of individual ambitions of President Xi Jinping, reflect this penchant for domination of other races and people.
Further, the Foreign Policy commentary notes, China has “put more vessels to sea between 2014
and 2018 than the total number of
ships in the German, Indian, Spanish, and British navies combined.”27 Its technological and military modernisation programmes or even economic domination should not have threatened or alarmed other countries. But it has been coercing virtually all its
neighbours to capture pieces of
land and water. The virtual occupation of South China Sea and confrontation with Japan in the East
China Sea over the Spratly Island has
been followed up with attempts to further push
borders with India beyond its own stated position of 1960s and later.
Borders with Nepal and Bhutan
have also been
26
Brands and Jake Sullivan,
“China has two Paths to Global Domination”,Foreign Policy, May 22, 2020, https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold- war/.
27 Ibid.
breached. Under these circumstances, Chinese actions
arouse nervousness all over the
world, especially given its internal political
dynamics and a strategic psyche of territorial and national expansion. China
has clearly demonstrated a tendency to use its economic and military capacity
for outright coercion of smaller
nations and powers.
Under these circumstances, it is
clear that China seeks domination
over others and not “peaceful co-existence.” The model of funding such military modernisation and sustaining economic development by securing access to
uninterrupted supplies of natural
resources and creating captive markets, as well as using diplomatic as well as covert influence
to preserve these, are quite worrying. Chinese
support to autocratic and even rogue regimes is well known.
Beijing has simultaneously been
increasing its domination and
influence in resource rich Central Asia and the Eurasian region as well, in an attempt to consolidate its questionable control
and oppression of people in Tibet and Xinjiang. Resource
rich but impoverished countries of Africa are threatened by the burgeoning Chinese
might. China’s major trading
partners, or suppliers of natural resources are some of the most impoverished countries with
somewhat non-transparent political
system. At the top of the list are “South Sudan,
Angola, Eritrea, The Gambia,
DR Congo, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Central
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Mauritania.”28 A media report recently
suggested that “China also gets 95% of South Sudan’s
crude petroleum exports
as of 2017. These included
funnelling a sixth of its total
daily output – 30,000 out
of 170,000 barrels
28
Abdi Latif Dahir,
“Africa’s resource-rich nations are getting even more reliant on China for their exports” Quartz Africa, April 26, 2019, https:// qz.com/africa/1605497/belt-and-road-africa-mineral-rich-nations-export- mostly-to-china/.
–
to the Export-Import Bank of China to fund the young
nation’s infrastructure needs.”29 Simultaneously, resentment has
been growing against China, and this, in a few cases, has resulted
in the killing of Chinese
employees of various
Chinese corporations and projects in Africa.
Source: John Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies as borrowed
from UN Comtrade30
The extent of Chinese influence in
Africa is difficult to evaluate
simply on the basis of available data of trade and investment. Former Financial
Times correspondent in Africa, Tom
Burgis had highlighted China’s role in what he described as “loot of the resources of the continent”, along with few other
29
Ibid.
30
“China-Africa Trade”,
John Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, accessed
on July 16, 2020, http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china- africa-trade.
shadowy forces.31 He has specifically documented China’s murky dealings through a controversial
conduit, Sam Pa, to exact huge
amounts of resources by bribing autocrats and
dictators and securing access to infrastructure projects.
The US magazine National
Interest claimed:
China lent nearly USD125 billion to Africa between 2000 and 2006 and recently
pledged USD 60 billion at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. The Chinese superficially appear to maintain
a mutually beneficial relationship with Africa by providing financial and technical assistance to Africa’s
pressing developmental needs.
Trade between China
and Africa has grown from USD10 billion in 2000 to
USD190 billion by 2017. It is
estimated that 12 per cent of Africa’s industrial production, or USD500 billion annually
– nearly half of Africa’s
internationally contracted construction market – is carried out by Chinese firms.32
It is clear that China’s expanding
military and economic capacities seem
to supplement each other. Logistical bases acquired
under BRI or expansion in Central Asia
or South China
Sea and even Africa are likely to bolster Chinese
capacities for both economic
and military domination, not only within those regions
but at a global scale.
China appears to be locking
up resources in these regions for its exclusive use, exploiting the vulnerabilities of people there. People in these regions are
31
Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs,
Corporations, Smugglers and The Theft
of Africa’s Wealth, Public Affairs, New York, 2015.
32
Akol Nyok Akol Dok and Bradley Thayer, “Takeover Trap: Why Imperialist China Is Invading Africa”, The
National Interest, July 10, 2019, https://
nationalinterest.org/feature/takeover-trap-why-imperialist-china-invading- africa-66421.
becoming so dependent upon China that their own ability
to decide their destiny
is being seriously undermined. On the other hand, secure and captive access to
resources and markets will keep
fuelling China’s own economy, notwithstanding some benefits reaching others, giving Beijing enough surpluses to invest in military
and technological modernisation, which help build its capacity to dominate others
even further.
All this underlines the need for a concerted effort to address
a larger challenge to meet the developmental
aspirations of the people
of poor but resource-rich nations.
China’s quest for military and economic domination
through the existing model of
development threatens to throw these regions into perpetual instability and poverty and to undermine the security of world at large. Countermeasures by
impacted states are likely to enormously enhance
the role of the military-industrial complex, dislocating the broader agenda of global governance.
It is extremely difficult to second-guess China’s
intentions within the region
or beyond, to assess their larger impact on India’s
national security. Nevertheless, a careful appreciation of the larger regional and global context, as well as overall capacities – economic, strategic,
military, technological and diplomatic – in the context of China’s recent
moves, presents a highly
disturbing trend. China has openly flaunted its superior strength and has not hesitated to browbeat independent nations. For example,
Australia, which has been a longstanding supplier
of commodities and natural resources
to China, has been complaining for quite some time about
clandestine Chinese interference
within their country, including in critical political processes. Many Australians perceive this phenomenon as detrimental to
their own people and violative of transparency
in governance. The Chinese have simply been dismissive of such reports.
Recently, when Prime Minister
Scott Morrison called for
independent review to probe the role of China into the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese Ambassador, in somewhat undiplomatic language, threatened Australia
with sanctions. Quintessentially vituperative editor of Global Times went a few steps ahead to insult
Australians when he wrote: “Australia
is always there, making trouble. It is a bit like chewing gum stuck on the sole of China’s shoes. Sometimes you have to find a stone to rub it off.”33 It
is such disdainful dismissal of
criticism that causes concern over both the rising economic influence of China and many of the unethical ways it employs to support and sustain its
economic and military empowerment.
China has repeatedly shown its
aggressive intent towards India, and such instances
have increased in recent years.
This could be driven by its own understanding of its relative economic-military and even purported
cultural superiority, compared to India. The larger international as well as domestic context of China, along with some of
India’s vulnerabilities, may have
given an additional push to such an approach. As a major power, India cannot risk its national security interests and objectives by relying on the good
intentions of others. While New Delhi’s immediate
options may be limited as far as addressing the standoff on the border
is concerned, a long- term restructuring of all its institutions to bolster their
capacity is indispensable for the defence of India as a civilisation and a state.
33
Felix K. Chang,
“Social Distancing: Australia’s Relations with China”, Foreign Policy Research
Institute, May 22, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/ article/2020/05/social-distancing-australias-relations-with-china/.
THREATS FROM PAKISTAN
Pakistan has remained a perennial
threat and it is likely to remain so
for a long time. The primary national security threat from Pakistan can be
summarised as under:
Military-Strategic Threat as a neighbour; Low-cost diffuse covert war in Kashmir;
Its covert capacity to use global
terror and crime to pursue the
strategic and mercenary objectives of the Pakistani deep state;
There has been complete
unanimity among security
experts that Pakistan on its own is incapable of posing any serious
conventional threat to India. Its nuclear deterrence is a credible
shield against a conventional military confrontation against a much stronger India. Nevertheless, Pakistan remains an important factor in a hypothetical
situation of two-front conflict, in
which its territories can be used by China and
Pakistani armed forces can operate
alongside the Chinese. Hence, its oversised conventional capabilities compared to size
of its territory and population cannot entirely be ignored. Its higher number of nuclear warheads and stockpile is again a matter of concern, given its
congenital hatred towards India and the pervasive
fragility of its formal state structure.
PAKISTAN’S USE OF TERROR IN KASHMIR’S PROXY WAR
What has troubled and irritated
India most is the sustained covert war in Kashmir,
with its combination of terrorism, propaganda, subversion and
radicalisation. Such wars
in general are difficult to handle but the one that the Indian security
forces have been fighting in
Kashmir is, indeed, the most complex of its
kind. Even the most formidable conventional armed forces, with
access to the most sophisticated firepower and absence
of
the kind of restraint that the Indian Army exercises
in Kashmir, have failed to conclude such wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. What has
complicated this conflict is the infusion of the element of the Islamic identity,
for which the Pakistani military
establishment had been investing intensive clandestine efforts soon after Zia ul Haq took over the reins
of power in Pakistan.
The Pakistani deep state exploited
the porous border to create pockets
of support through Islamic radicalisation and
propaganda to avenge Pakistan’s comprehensive debacle in Bangladesh, and wrest Kashmir through a
new strategy. Such efforts took nearly a decade for fruition, when concerted militancy
erupted in the state in the late 1980s. The Indian state
was not fully prepared and it had ignored clandestine activities and
subversion that had been going on for some time, and that probably continues even now in other
parts of the country as well.
Manipulation and rigging of local elections may have acted as a trigger, but such well-organised armed attacks on security forces and civilians was
impossible without sustained secret planning,
organisation, coordination and financial- military
backing by Pakistan’s state machinery.34
It is pertinent to recall that, following Soviet Russia’s intervention in Afghanistan and the strategies used by Pakistan
with the backing of allied forces to destabilise Afghanistan, there was a steep rise in Rawalpindi’s overall technical, financial and social capacities to fight proxy war. The Pakistani state
recruited young people both domestically as well as from the wider region and beyond, who were
radicalised, trained and launched
into Kashmir. Hence, the initial armed militants
34
Priyanka Bakaya and
Sumeet Bhatti, “Kashmir Conflict: A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley & Proposed Future
Solutions”, 2005, https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Kashmir%20Conflict%20-%20
A%20Study%20of%20What%20Led%20to%20the%20Insurgency%20 in%20Kashmir%20Valley.pdf.
in the Kashmir
Valley in the 1990s were mostly outsiders. The Pakistani state relied on the spiral impact of such war to provoke excesses by the Indian security
forces, which like all other
conventional militaries initially struggled to handle such guerrilla attacks where civilians were used as shield.
As the conflict prolonged, some degree of alienation of the
local population was inevitable. The Pakistani deep state exploited
this with their infrastructure across
the border, to provide sanctuary, succour and support
to sections of the youth who had been
radicalised by Pakistani infiltrators and local
sympathisers. With their newfound resources, they could fund and arm an Islamic insurgency and use their diplomatic infrastructure to lavishly spread
propaganda to build further pressure on the Indian state. Exploiting the constraints of security
forces to protect civilian population over such a large area, small but well-armed Pakistani sponsored groups held civilian
populations to ransom,
forcing complete exodus
of the minority Hindu population from the Kashmir valley.
Nevertheless, there has been remarkable fightback from the Indian state, which has been spearheaded
domestically by the Indian Army and
backed by Central Para-military Forces and the
State Police. Sections of the civilian Muslim population also started speaking out against Pakistan-backed forces once the security situation
improved. But the very dynamics
of such diffuse but identity-driven irregular war generated
large-scale radicalisation and some
degree of avoidable alienation of the local
population. It was both the democratic credentials of Indian state as well as subsequent improvement in capacities of Indian security forces to fight such a
war that led to a steep decline in
armed militancy from around 2005-06. Following
table, drawn from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) reflects the broad trend:
Source: South Asia Terrorism
Portal (SATP)
While there has not been a comprehensive study
to calculate total costs of Pakistani sponsored
covert war in Kashmir, its negative
impact on India’s larger economic development must be significant. Security forces have built capacities to handle the element of violence, especially acts
perpetrated on Indian territory, but appreciation of the complexity of the entire
range instruments deployed in
this form of conflict, as well as their effective
neutralisation, remains a challenge. All traditional counter-insurgency experts have unanimously observed that it is easy to ignite an insurgency, but eliminating one is extremely difficult.
Even among these, the one driven
by Islamic identity has been the most emotive
in the overall context of South and West Asia,
especially after 1980s. There appears to be no solution
to such identity driven hatred,
which initially led to creation
of Pakistan, and which continues to drive the persecution of non-Muslims in that country even now. It
manifested itself in expulsion of
Hindus from the Kashmir Valley. Hence, despite
exposure of the Pakistani role in fomenting
radicalised Islamic
terror in the Valley and its world-wide infrastructure
for terror and propaganda, years of radicalisation and unavoidable civilian losses have given a push to the
very momentum of such insurgency. Amidst these, the Pakistani cross-border infrastructure of support,
sanctuary and radicalisation has never allowed the situation to normalise.
Most Western experts have
displayed limited understanding of the complexity of the Islamic
identity-driven war engineered by Pakistan through
every possible means. Many of them came to realise the potent appeal of a
certain version of Islam in inciting
hatred and terror against non-Muslims, and deeper involvement of Pakistan
in this game, only after the 9/11 terror attacks. This changed perceptions about Pakistan forever.
However, the Pakistani
security establishment managed
to pretend to be with the
West at one end and continue with their clandestine terrorism-backed war against India.
Most western security experts
still struggle to appreciate that Pakistan
carries the legacy of the biggest man-made
carnage and genocide in the name of Islam in recent human history, the partition of the
subcontinent, and such sentiments continue
to drive sections of the Pakistani security establishment and society. With its own strategic objectives
of containing Soviet Russia, the West
had turned a blind eye to Pakistani transgressions
during the Cold War era. The idea of Islamic
radicalisation reached its pinnacle during the conflict with the Soviets in Afghanistan. There was little
foresight within the West’s own
security establishment about the larger strategic consequences of this development. There was no empathy about the possible
impact of radicalisation on secular India and the plight
of people in the entire subcontinent.
It has taken several
decades and huge human costs to force
a realisation about the enormity
of identity-driven conflicts.
Even now, sections of the Pakistani state establishment and civil society
continue to emphasise
the superior identity
of Muslims in a language
that makes any reconciliation and peaceful coexistence with India nearly
impossible in foreseeable future. No amount
of concession and goodwill is going to help, as the Pakistani state is simply incapable
of reining in such forces.
There has been a large number of
studies in recent years emphasising the challenges of the emotive
dimensions of identity-driven irregular wars that India
has been facing from Pakistan. In one well-researched paper, Louis Kriesberg
argues that collective identities create “difficulty in reaching an accommodation between conflicting
groups.”35 Kriesberg maintains, “members of groups
with identities that place a high priority on being honoured and being
treated with deference may have
difficulty making compromises for or respecting other groups. Furthermore, some self-conceptions relating
to ideas of sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy constitute barriers to successful settlement of a
conflict.”36 It is precisely such a psyche that has shaped the
Pakistani outlook towards India. Many
among its security and political establishment
continue to emphasise
the superior identity
of Muslims. Voices
of sanity, who talk of accommodation and coexistence are simply snuffed out. This is what explains
the demolition of a Hindu temple in
Islamabad,37 and the continuous succession of atrocities and state protected
discrimination against all minorities in Pakistan.38
35
Louis Kriesberg, “Identity Issues”, Beyond Intractability, July 2003, https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity_issues.
36 Ibid.
37
“Temple Built With Govt Permission Demolished In Islamabad In Pak, No Action From Minority Ministry”,
CNN-News18, July 7, 2020, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_79GHL9Ako.
38 Rajat Sharma, “Double Faced Pakistan: Attacks on Hindus and Temples’,
India
TV, November 03, 2020, https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/
It is, again, these sentiments that drive the Pakistani covert
war in Kashmir through use of terror, subversion and crime – to defy its original instrument of accession with India or wider aspiration of Kashmiris to stay with
India as demonstrated in peace and tranquillity in the Valley
decades after independence. It was a failure of the strategic psyche and somewhat fragile governance that allowed the Pakistani deep state to initiate this identity driven diffuse war in the region.
In its United Nations System Staff
College paper, Britta Gade observes,
“Armed violence has progressively become more
complex over the past three decades. Not only has the number of wars that are exclusively inter-state decreased – it has become increasingly difficult to
distinguish between armed conflict
and contexts that are shaped by regular
instances of violence and crime without being considered in official statistics. The proliferation of
non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and
the rise of identity-driven insurgency has led to the assumption that we are dealing with an entirely
new type of warfare, the so-called ‘new wars’.” 39
A careful examination would
suggest that an appreciation among
academics about such wars may be new, but not the nature of these wars, particularly given the predominance of clandestine and covert elements in
conflict. Gade goes on to add “even
though the idea that these
wars are entirely
new is debated, both within
academic as well as in practitioners’ circles,
the complexity of armed violence today does pose important challenges to the UN and its partners. This starts
double-faced-pakistan-attacks-on-hindus-and-temples-rajat-sharma- opinion-aaj-ki-baat-662066.
39
Britta Gade,
“Understanding the Complexity of Armed Violence in the 21st Century”, United
Nations System Staff College, November 15, 2018, https://www.unssc.org/news-and-insights/blog/understanding-complexity- armed-violence-21st-century/.
with the question of what non-state armed groups really are. Many of them are in fact not entirely
‘non-state’ but cultivate good
relations to official authorities… Many have links to organized crime networks and engage in the trafficking of drugs, weapons or natural resources… non-state armed groups
need to be understood in their local context.”40
In recent years, every independent research
study has concluded that
Pakistan has traditionally used Islamic extremism and terrorism to further its strategic interests
in the region. It is now universally acknowledged that it
is the Pakistani deep state that has
created, nurtured and supported terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), the Mullah Nazir
Group, Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM), and
the Afghan Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani
Network, among others. In recent years, it has been found propagating the idea of Ghazwa-e-Hind, which has energised and motivated a large number
of Pakistani and even non-Pakistani
youth. This concept has been advocating the conquest
of the entire Indian subcontinent by Muslims.41 As part of this larger agenda,
several religious preachers
have also been making inciting sermons to help
recruit cadres. Several preachers and
mosques within India have been feeding such propaganda
through their interpretation of certain tenets of Islam that are hateful towards non-Muslims, creating a larger support
structure for the Pakistani deep state.
PAKISTAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIFFUSE COVERT WAR
Over the years, the deep state of
Pakistan appears to have built formidable world-wide capacities – in the form of spirited crime
syndicates, radicalised clerics
as well as organised
40 Ibid
41
“Ghazwa-e-Hind” Islam & Islamic Laws,
July 11, 2019, http://www.islam laws.com/ghazwa-e-hind/.
terrorist groups in the region and beyond – that are
financially self-sustaining and appear particularly rewarding to their incumbents.
Hence, Pakistan’s comprehensive infrastructure
for all-out diffuse
covert war through
every possible means
– including propaganda, deception, terrorism and clandestine subversion – cannot easily be dismantled.
Even though some of the terrorist groups have drifted
apart and splintered, Pakistan’s larger clout among a significant number of these remains intact. This has been demonstrated
by facilitation of the recent
US-Taliban Agreement by Pakistan.
Recently the European Foundation for South Asian Studies
(EFSAS) as well as the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) accused
Pakistan of “stoking
the present escalation of Taliban violence” in Afghanistan.42 These reports
go on to argue that “if Pakistan possessed enough leverage over the Taliban to get it to the
negotiating table with the US, it
certainly should have the clout to get the Taliban to eschew violence at a time when such violence is
threatening to tear apart the
US-Taliban agreement.”43 Such developments only reflect that the Pakistani deep state is unlikely to give up the covert capacity which it has built over
the years. It is keen to control both
Afghanistan and its drug trade, and yet manage a strong bargain with the United States.
Given the obvious threats
that they face from these groups, the West has been more concerned
with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani
Network. India thus, has to devise its own ways and means, along with suitable low-cost
and sustainable capacities, of addressing
Pakistan’s covert war.
42
ANI, “Pakistan’s
behind-the-scenes role in thwarting intra-Afghan talks comes to fore with intensified Taliban violence”, Business World, July 18, 2020, http://www.businessworld.in/article/Pakistan-s-behind-the-scenes- role-in-thwarting-intra-Afghan-talks-comes-to-fore-with-intensified- Taliban-violence/18-07-2020-298850/.
43 Ibid.
Crucially, Pakistan’s entire
claims about its so-called War on Terror
are misleading. Counterextremism.com, an American watchdog on extremism and counter
terrorism observed in a July 2020 report that:
Pakistan has instead focused
most of its counterterrorism operations against groups that seek to
challenge and overthrow the Pakistani
state. These groups, which pose a more direct threat to the state, include the Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP)––a subset of the Pakistani Taliban
and the deadliest of indigenous Pakistani extremist groups,
al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).44
The report goes on to note that
Pakistani Prime Minister “Imran Khan
accepted Pakistan’s responsibility in creating
multiple militant groups but said that they no longer served Pakistan’s interests and fighting
violent extremism was necessary for Pakistan’s stability.”45
But a July 2020 European
Foundation for South Asian Studies
report clearly suggests that either Imran Khan has been misguiding the international community or he is in no position to push the Pakistani deep state
to give up its clout through terrorist
proxies even in Afghanistan, where the Americans are at receiving end. Arguing
that Pakistan’s past counter-extremism efforts
have generally been insufficient, the American
watchdog quotes a 2016 report
of the US Department of State which claimed, “Pakistan was
not doing enough to disrupt the activities of LeT and JeM – both of which continue
to operate, train, organize and fundraise within Pakistan.”46 It
44
“Pakistan: Extremism & Counter-Extremism”, Counter Extremism Project, July 20, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/pakistan.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
is well known that LeT and JeM are operating in Kashmir. Subsequently, Indian authorities have
cited a huge amount of data that
confirms Pakistani involvement in large number of terrorist attacks,
including the Pulwama incident
of 2019.47
Pakistan’s world-wide influence
and role in global terrorism is not new. Following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, there had been increasing disclosures by Western
intelligence agencies about the level
of radicalisation in Pakistan, radicalisation that has impacted Pakistanis almost all over the world. Even second- generation British Pakistanis were on the forefront in the Islamic
State-backed jihad in Syria. Disclosures in 2013, quoting
MI5, claimed that hundreds of British Muslims were fighting in Syria.48 Subsequent media
reports revealed that a majority of
them were first- and second-generation British Pakistanis. British academic Lewis Herrington released
graphic details quoting intelligence
sources about British Pakistani nationals, radicalised
in Pakistan or within the Pakistani community in the United Kingdom, conspiring to perpetrate terror attacks in Britain and beyond.49
Herrington had quoted the then MI5 Chief stating
that, in November 2006, the
agency knew of up to 30 terrorist- related
plots designed to kill UK citizens and damage the economy. He had also quoted political sociologist and former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
officer Marc Sageman who had argued that the greatest
threat of terrorism
came from
47
Muhammad Feyyaz, “Contextualizing the Pulwama Attack
in Kashmir
– A Perspective from Pakistan”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 13, Number 2,
2019, pp. 69-74.
48
“Hundreds of Britons
fighting in Syria - MI5 chief”, BB News,
November 7, 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24856553.
49
Lewis Herrington, “British Islamic extremist
terrorism: the declining
significance of Al–Qaeda
and Pakistan”, International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 1, 2015, pp.17–35.
westernised Muslims undergoing the process of radicalisation in inner-city areas of Birmingham, Luton,
Leeds and London, describing these places as the ‘hotbeds
of radicalisation’. Most
of these areas are dominated
by Pakistanis.50
The writer, who was posted as a diplomat
in Indian mission in London during 2009-12, during a
visit to Sheffield in November
2009 came across shocking levels of hatred
among sections of British Pakistanis against Indians. In his role as Consular Officer, he had taken up
the issue of British Pakistanis consistently harassing Indian female students. During the visit, the concerned
police authorities of West Yorkshire Police District, initiated
action. Eventually, they landed up conducting 35 to 36 raids
throughout their jurisdiction as they discovered that the concerned
British Pakistanis were
radicalised and involved in drug trafficking,
which suggested a strong possibility of their involvement in Pakistan-linked terrorist plots in the UK. Further details were not available, but the incident
highlighted the reality of deep- rooted radicalisation among Pakistani youth
in the UK.
In his 2015 study, Herrington claimed:
…without exception, Pakistan
served as the main training
ground for those who engaged
in Islamic extremist terrorism in Britain between
2003 and 2006. In four of the five plots
examined, two individuals external to
the cell organized and partly financed the training.
The first and perhaps the most high-profile individual alleged
to have performed the tasks of fundraising and facilitating is Luton-based Mohammed
Quyyam Khan, also known as Q. Both the Crevice conspirators and the now deceased
Theseus suicide
50 Ibid.
bombers received direct
assistance from Q in obtaining
training in Pakistan.
A second man, Mohammed al-Ghabra, organized trips to Pakistan for the cell members
of both Vivace and Overt. In all four plots,
evidence suggests the conspirators received
explosives training from Al-Qaeda specialists, namely Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi and Abu Ubaida al-Masri. Operation
Crevice – the notorious ‘fertilizer plot’ exposed in 2003
– clearly illustrates Pakistan’s role in training and finance before
2006. British-born and raised Omar Khyam is widely believed
to have led the conspirators, whose targets included nightclubs, shopping centers and domestic utility installations. Aged
18, Khyam travelled to Kashmir and fought with Pakistani-backed Islamist groups against Indian
forces. Before returning to London in 2001 he spent time in Afghanistan, obtaining an audience with Taliban commander Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi. Following this meeting,
Khyam agreed to undertake
fundraising in order to supply finance and equipment
to Hadi. By 2003, Khyam and his friends were
sending up to £4,000 a month to Afghanistan.
Khyam and at least four other associates were already attending events facilitated by the now
banned Islamic fundamentalist group
Al-Muhajiroun (ALM).”51
Such details are the tip of a much
bigger iceberg,52 but these
highlight the extent of radicalisation in Pakistan and its wider global impact. Though several
reports claim that such threats from Pakistan have declined in recent years,
the regular trickle of terrorists in Kashmir or
Pakistani clout with Afghan Taliban or its nexus with larger
terror-crime syndicates, appear
51 Ibid.
52
“Pakistan: The
Footprints of Terror”, South Asia
Terrorism Portal, https:// www.satp.org/islamist-extremism/data/Pakistan-The-Footprints-of-Terror.
intact. Given the clandestine nature of the entire
edifice and infrastructure of terror,
security agencies – despite massive access to resources and professional specialisation – have struggled to tame these forces. The challenge becomes
formidable when a large number of state agencies encourage, abet and clandestinely or even openly
support such forces of terror, as has been the case with Pakistan.
A few spirited investigative
journalists and researchers may have
exposed this nexus, but the real contours of the dynamically evolving world of terror is difficult to fathom in its entirety. Pakistan’s deep state or,
for that matter, any other force, may
not be able to control and regulate all the terrorist proxies it once created. But its covert
capacity to regulate
and manage a large number of these remains formidable. Further, the kind of radicalisation that it has helped ignite
on the subcontinent and beyond has
gathered its own momentum, feeding not merely terrorism
but also more complex shades
of global crime that are not easy to detect. The dynamics of secrecy
and deception enhance
the magnitude of the threat
and overall pressure on security agencies.
Despite the containment of the
terrorist infrastructure in many
parts of the world, Pakistan’s capacity to peddle terror as well as global crime through clandestine global syndicates appears
substantially intact. Such capacity for terror can transition
into different forms of subversion with a reduced level or newer form of violence. Pakistan’s nuclear power status allows it to pursue these
strategies with confidence. An open state with somewhat deficient
institutions of governance like
India, which has been facing the brunt of Pakistani covert and clandestine subversion, is far more
vulnerable. The poor regulatory
capacity of the Indian state in the context of a deficient criminal-justice system,
enhances such vulnerability.
Simultaneously, though the large
Muslim population of India has so far
escaped the deep spiral of radicalisation, the
Indian state has traditionally neglected subversive propaganda by organised seminaries in the name of religious freedom. The possibility of some degree of
clandestine involvement of the Pakistani
deep state cannot be ruled out.
But the expanding social fissures and
continued propagation of somewhat conflicting
versions of Islam by even the most established seminaries, such as Deoband, have the potential
to undermine social cohesion of India,
which can have seriously negative consequences for its overall national strength. While rationalisation of all shades
of crime in the name of religion
must be strictly curbed through an
efficient criminal justice system, any attempt to undermine India’s
social cohesion enhances
its vulnerability to subversive propaganda by Pakistan-linked groups.
LIMITED IMPACT OF FATF
ACTION
Indian authorities appeared pleased
at the decision of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) to place Pakistan on the grey list in June 2018. Given the level of the Pakistani deep state’s direct and indirect involvement in all shades of terrorism
and global crime, the move was fairly mild. Interestingly, the Asia Pacific Group (APG), an
intergovernmental technical body of 41 states on anti-money laundering and counter
terrorist financing, in its October 2019 report, pointed out serious
deficiencies in Pakistani
compliance on checking
money laundering and terror-financing. The report rated Pakistan
as non-compliant or partially compliant on most of the 40 parameters identified for evaluation of its progress
on countering terror finance and money laundering. It also highlights serious institutional deficiencies and lack of autonomy as well as integrity where
institutions just cannot
act independently. The
report pointed out:
Pakistan completedits first
Money Laundering (ML)
and Terror Finance (TF)
National Risk Assessment (NRA) in
2017. However, the NRA lacks a comprehensive
analysis. Competent authorities have varying levels of understanding of the country’s ML and TF
risks, and the private sector has a mixed understanding of risks.
While Pakistan has established a multi-agency approach on the subject,
it is not implementing a comprehensive and coordinated risk-based approach to combating
ML and TF.
Pakistan is using financial intelligence to
combat ML, TF, predicate
crimes and trace property for confiscation but only to a minimal
extent. Critically, the FMU (Financial Monitoring Unit) cannot
spontaneously or upon request
disseminate information and the results of
its analysis to provincial CTDs (Counter-Terrorism Departments), which are
designated as TF investigation authorities.
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) have undertaken 2,420 ML investigations, resulting in 354 prosecutions (primarily self-laundering cases) and the conviction of one natural person for self-laundering related to corruption.
Pakistan’s law enforcement efforts to address
ML are not consistent with its
risks.
LEAs have measures
to freeze, seize, and prevent
dealing with property subject to confiscation. LEAs are seizing some assets in predicate offences
cases, but not in
terror related ML cases.
Overall, the value of confiscated funds is not commensurate
with Pakistan’s ML/TF risk profile. In addition, the cross-border cash declaration system is
not effectively utilised
to seize cash/Bearer Negotiable Instruments
at the border.
Screening by Financial
Institutions (FIs) and Designated
Non-Financial Businesses & Professions (DNFBP)
is similar to that of TFS for terrorism and TF. No funds
or assets owned have been frozen.
All other FIs have limited understanding of
their ML/ TF risks.
NBFIs are not filing Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) commensurate with ML/TF risks
in these sectors.
There are no enforceable AML/CFT
(Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing
of Terrorism) requirements for Pakistan Post, CDNS (Central
Directorates of National
Savings) and DNFBPs.
The State Bank of Pakistan
does not have a clear
understanding of the ML and TF risks unique to the sectors
it supervises.
The Securities and Exchange Commission of
Pakistan (SECP) has a limited
understanding of ML/TF risks and has not implemented a risk-based supervisory approach.
There is little evidence that SECP’s supervisory activity is improving.
Major ML predicate crimes include corruption,
drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion,
smuggling, human trafficking and organized crime. Corruption is endemic across Pakistan’s economy. As with TF
noted above, Pakistan’s geography and
porous borders increase its vulnerability to smuggling and narcotics trafficking.53
53
“Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures- Pakistan” Mutual
Evaluation Report, APG, October
2019, http://www.fatf-
Not much has changed over successive evaluations, beyond some formal
compliance, as in the passage
of legislation. In its
latest Plenary on October 21-23, 2020, FATF once again retained Pakistan on its grey list, with the organisation’s President, Marcus Pleyer pointing to very serious deficiencies that still have to be repaired and observing that Pakistan, consequently, still faced the risk of being moved to the ‘black- list’. In its release on October 23,
2020, FATF, stated, that “as all action plan deadlines have expired, the FATF strongly
urges Pakistan to swiftly
complete its full action plan by February 2021”.54 In
the release it asked Pakistan to
…continue to work on implementing its action plan
to address its strategic deficiencies, including by:
(1)
demonstrating that
law enforcement agencies are identifying
and investigating the widest range of TF [terrorist
financing] activity and that TF investigations
and prosecutions target designated persons
and entities, and those acting
on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons
or entities; (2) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective,
proportionate and dissuasive
sanctions; (3) demonstrating effective implementation
of targeted financial sanctions against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting
for or on their behalf,
preventing the raising
and moving of funds including
in relation to NPOs [Non- Profit
Organisations], identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access
to
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/APG-Mutual-Evaluation- Report-Pakistan-October%202019.pdf.
54
Fayyaz Hussain,
“‘To remain on grey list’: FATF urges Pakistan to complete action
plan by Feb 2021”, Dawn, October 24, 2020, https://www. dawn.com/news/1586624/to-remain-on-grey-list-fatf-urges-pakistan-to- complete-action-plan-by-feb-2021.
funds and financial services; and (4)
demonstrating enforcement against
TFS [Targeted Financial
Sanctions] violations, including in relation to NPOs, of administrative and criminal penalties
and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases.55
Despite such observations Pakistan
has demonstrated the determination as
well as the clout of the deep state to evade
the noose of international watchdogs. None of the major member countries, including
US, UK, China and France made
any adverse remarks against Pakistan, or called for the country’s blacklisting for such defiance. The West may have done so because of its dependence on the
Pakistani security establishment in Afghanistan or in deference
to Pakistani support for their counter-terror
operations within their own countries or regions. China’s
support to Pakistan
is well known, and Beijing is in a position to exploit Pakistani clout with terrorist groups to its own advantage, at least for the time being, both internally and
externally. However, the net outcome of such a scenario does not augur well for India.
Following observation by the non-governmental American
watchdog mentioned above
becomes significant:
“On April 20, 2020, it was
reported that Pakistan removed thousands
of names from its terrorist watch list over the past 18 months. Among the names removed were senior members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and
Lashkar-e-Taiba. The proscribed persons list, maintained by Pakistan’s National
Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), provides a guideline for
55
Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, FATF, October
23, 2020, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored- jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2020. html#pakistan.
financial institutions to avoid doing business
with or processing transactions of suspected terrorists.”56
It is abundantly clear that FATF and international (Western) pressure
has proved demonstrably inadequate in dismantling Pakistan’s terrorist
infrastructure.
NEXUS WITH CRIME
Organised crime has always
been used to fund insurgencies and terrorism. Various studies have consistently highlighted this dimension. The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) observes:
…terrorists require financing to recruit and
support members, maintain
logistics hubs, and conduct operations. Thus, preventing terrorists
from accessing financial resources is
crucial to successfully counter the threat
of terrorism. However,
many States lack
the legal and operational frameworks and technical expertise needed to detect, investigate
and prosecute terrorist financing
cases.57
In fact, UNODC reports
have successively highlighted the terror–crime nexus, along with the capacities of state institutions.
The UN Security Council has always
been cognizant of this connection and
a month after the 9/11 attacks, it adopted resolution
1373/2001, which recognised a “close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized
56
“Pakistan: Extremism & Counter-Extremism”, Counter Extremism Project, op. cit.
57
“Countering Terrorist
Financing”, UNODC, accessed on July 17, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/news-and-events/terrorist- financing.html.
crime, illicit drugs,
money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.”58 The resolution called for “national, regional and international
cooperation to combat terrorism financing
and money laundering.”59
In March 2019, the UN Security Council adopted yet
another resolution (2462),
which addressed terrorism financing, and in
July 2019 an open debate
took place at the UNSC on organised crime–terrorism linkages. Yet, real progress
in implementation has been extremely difficult.60
Both Indian and other agencies
have regularly highlighted the Pakistani
nexus with global crimes such as money laundering, drug-trafficking, circulation of fake currencies, extortion and piracy. Over the years, formidable Pakistani
state-backed crime networks have expanded their clout and reach.
It is well known that the most sophisticated crime cartel run by Dawood Ibrahim on Indian soil had
the active support of the Pakistani
state till he fled to Pakistan in the wake of the 1993 serial bombings in Mumbai. Pakistan is now sheltering Dawood Ibrahim in Karachi and assisting in
the clandestine operations of his group,
which operates across
South and South East Asia,
Africa, and Europe.
Social capital with terror groups
is a low-risk and high gain
commercial proposition for both the Pakistani deep state and for organised crime groups. Terrorism is a smaller but significant component of the entire edifice
and infrastructure
58
Summer Walker and
Tuesday Reitano, “New Security Council Resolution recognizes broader links between terrorism and organized
crime”, Global Initiative, July 26, 2019,
https://globalinitiative.net/new-security-council- resolution-recognizes-broader-links-between-terrorism-and-organized- crime/.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
that generates huge all-round dividends. The link with
terror and radicalisation converts illicit
and criminal operations into a religious obligation. There are multiple
reports indicating how the
Pakistani deep state and Taliban have been controlling the lucrative drug trade in Afghanistan.
In this connection, a few recent
incidents have caught
the attention of security specialists. One pertains to gold smuggling
through alleged misuse
of the diplomatic bag by the UAE Consulate in Indian state of
Kerala. India’s top counter terror
investigation agency has initiated probe in to the matter.61 Whether the terror
link is established or not, what is worrisome
is that such smuggling has been going on for quite some time and it was only due to the spirited efforts
of officials that the crime was detected and action
was initiated on this occasion. Given the general
laxity and perceived corruption in many
government departments, the scale of such or similar crime may be quite high. Even if the terrorism link is not established, the very sustenance of such a
large-scale criminal link
constitutes a potential support structure for hostile state and non-state actors.
Similarly, on April 1, 2020, the
Sri Lankan Navy seized a vessel with
nine Pakistani nationals that was smuggling 605 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine and 579 kilograms of ketamine.62 Media reports
noted, “the seizure had reinforced contention of the Indian
agencies that Pak based cartels
had
61
“Kerala gold
smuggling case: NIA registers FIR to probe if it’s linked to terror activities”, The New Indian Express, July 10, 2020, https://www. newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2020/jul/10/kerala-gold-smuggling- case-nia-registers-fir-to-probe-if-its-linked-to-terror-activities-2167972. html.
62
Devesh K. Pa ndey, “Haul points to Pak-based cartels’ role in drug trafficking via sea routes”, The Hindu, April 2, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/haul-points-to-pak-based-cartels
role-in-drug-trafficking-via-sea- routes/article31237497.ece.
been indulging large scale drug trafficking via sea route
in the region.” The reports cited
the similar seizure of 500 kilograms of contraband heroin and 100 kilograms of methamphetamines on March 5, 2020, by the Sri Lanka Navy.
in which eight of the 16 arrested crew members were Pakistani nationals
and the origin of the
contraband was traced to Pakistan’s Makran Coast.
Reports had quoted officials and cited data that such seizures were the tip of a much larger iceberg of drug trade carried
out with the collusion of the Pakistani
deep state. The African bases of such cartels and
the arrest of Pakistan- sheltered Dawood Ibrahim’s son in Barcelona
in 2015 on charges of drug
trafficking give an idea of the larger footprint and reach of such cartels.63
A retired official of the Sri Lankan
Navy disclosed, on condition of
anonymity, that these were not the first incidents of their kind. In one such incident, which had not surfaced in the media, the Sri Lankan
Navy was probing
the role of its own retired
personnel who were caught off the Sri Lankan coast along with Pakistani nationals in 2016, while carrying
an illicit cargo of arms.64
Hence, the Pakistani deep state’s ability
and incentive to sustain its proxy war also provides
enormous individual gains and clout for its incumbents. The absence of a strong
and effective criminal justice system in India, as well as in other states affected by the
Pakistan-backed criminal-terrorist proxies,
works to the advantage of the Pakistani deep state. Their protection and sheltering of Dawood Ibrahim – whose networks
are believed to be active in money laundering, smuggling, drug and human trafficking,
extortion and several other crimes – is a clear indicator of the strong covert support
63 Ibid.
64 Telephonic interaction April 5, 2020.
structure that the group is running on Indian soil. The
problem is compounded by India’s
week and deficient criminal justice system,
which impedes ability of the state to guard itself and its people from serious subversion in such hostile regional geopolitics.
In this connection, it is worth
citing a 2014 study by the US Army that pointed out that “insurgents commonly use criminal
organisations to accomplish objectives.”65 It had identified “theft, drug, human trafficking, smuggling of illicit
materials, extortion, prostitution,
kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery and bribery” among the activities employed. Criminal
organisations may also assist insurgents in actions such as intimidating government officials, conducting assassinations, kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes,
demonstrations, riots, and smuggling
high value leaders, advisors or weapons.” Given the identity driven war by the Pakistani deep state, the very operation and existence of any organised
crime of this nature, or even
large-scale bureaucratic corruption or opaque political funding, enhances the overall vulnerability of India’s
national security.
India’s domestic security agencies
have contained the threat
to a significant extent but the response has largely been tactical.
Further, the fragility
of political and governance institutions, and a poor criminal justice
system have conceded space for
larger subversive networks to flourish and thrive. It is debatable whether
India was ever in a position to destroy the capacity of the Pakistani deep state
to raise such an army of radical
terror groups – in the process radicalising their own society. What is worrying is that, in the absence of such
65
“Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies”; Department of the Army, Washington: DC, June 2, 2014, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
capacities and progress
in the direction of building
such capacities, the cost of managing the Pakistani sponsored covert war is going
to increase, taking it to a level where it can hurt India economically,
socially and even politically.
NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT
The above analysis clearly
underlines the need for a strategic
paradigm shift on India’s national security strategy and outlook. Hostility from two major nuclear armed states – including a new global super power – who
happen to be its immediate
neighbours, multiply national security challenges, especially given the pressures of addressing rising needs and expectations of a burgeoning population.
China’s intent and capacity for
strategic domination of the region and beyond is fairly obvious. It has not only enhanced
the cost and risk of US intervention in most parts of Asia,
including the Far East, Asia-
Pacific and Central Asia, but its rising influence in Africa, South America and parts of Europe and even
West Asia, have aided its capacity
to challenge the US global domination. Its cohesive
political-governance apparatus
appears better capable
of responding to any crises, or extraordinary situations, more decisively, swiftly and flexibly than
democracies. Crucially, China’s
decisions appear largely unfettered even by human costs.
In the prevailing dynamics, as
well as given its strategic psyche,
China is likely to do everything possible to eliminate space for any challenge to its regional supremacy that India may pose, either on its own or in
collaboration with others. The sudden spurt in the Chinese
belligerence on Indian borders
since 2013, in the context of the Xi Jinping regime’s aggressive posture towards all its neighbours, except known client states like Pakistan, appears part
of a clear design. On the other hand, the very nature of evolution
of the Pakistani
state and society – with the rising influence of radical
forces and unrelenting grip of the
deep state over political power – makes
the possibility of peaceful co-existence, or a genuine and sustainable rapprochement with India, improbable in the foreseeable future. What is more worrying
is that, besides Chinese support
to Pakistan, even major Western
powers appear reluctant
to antagonise India’s
western neighbour beyond a certain point, despite a near-global
outcry against its collusion, support,
patronage and sponsorship of terrorism and organised
crime. This has been amply manifest
in the fairly soft approach
of the APG towards Islamabad’s brazen defiance of the
FATF guidelines on countering terror
finance.
The Pakistani deep state appears to be deriving
a form of tacit acknowledgment of its strength
and utility, by virtue of its clout with regional and global
crime-terror networks. Pakistan’s Military-ISI complex demonstrated its utility for the West by facilitating the US-Taliban
agreement in Afghanistan and remains
a possible conduit
for any potential tactical deal between the West and China in future.
India has to be alive to the
possibility that, in a tighter situation with limited choices, the West may even be content with simply confining Pakistani
influence and activities within this region,
rather than attempting a complete dismantling of its
terrorist and crime infrastructure,
the latter task appearing increasingly onerous.
Under these circumstances, India
needs to find innovative strategies to address the expanding asymmetry
of power vis-à-
vis China and quickly build capacities to crush the sustained low-cost covert war from Pakistan
that has been haemorrhaging it for decades. The nature of war in
Kashmir or the unique dynamics of terrorism and radicalisation has created such levels
of complexity that these are unlikely to be addressed through conventional
strategies.
India, as a major international power,
cannot risk its core national
security interests by relying primarily or exclusively on diplomatic support
and international goodwill,
even though these are critical
and must be pursued in all sincerity. Diplomatic
support and goodwill do not always translate into tangible and sustainable strength, given the fluid dynamics
of global and regional geopolitics. Unconditional military- security support also becomes difficult
if other parties do not have an
equally abiding stake in issues or if their gains are not commensurate with the risks involved in
such support. Hence, a stronger
and sustainable national
security capacity, involving
a proactive strategy
to deter hostile
intent and actions
of actual and potential adversaries, needs to be backed by stronger economic, technological and governance
capacities. At one level, India will have to shun its inward-looking approach, to
engage, influence and shape issues and events beyond its frontiers, without eroding
its military-economic strengths or diplomatic goodwill. On the other, it has to address its internal governance challenges and build
suitable defensive and offensive
capacities to address its security needs in the evolving situation.
India’s defence forces have been
exemplary in protecting the legitimate military interests of the country,
but its political- bureaucratic and corporate institutions, notwithstanding a few notable exceptions, have struggled to
optimise the country’s collective
potential and strengths and to harness these towards comprehensive national power. This has manifested in avoidable
asymmetry of power vis-à-vis China.
The inability of many governance institutions to perform optimally
or respond decisively and
swiftly to emergent challenges, has been worrying. The ongoing COVID-19
pandemic has already
tested our institutional capacities to handle an epidemic or natural
calamity of a large scale.
This only reinforces our
belief in the need for a major
transformational restructuring in this direction. This would also be critical
for securing, among others,
food-water-energy-communication needs of a massively
expanding population amidst depleting resources like land and water.
The relatively sluggish pace of
economic-technological advancement,
in the context of the prevailing security and
geopolitical dynamics, could become increasingly serious national
security challenges. Similarly, a deficient criminal justice system generates
avoidable stress on internal social
and political cohesion and compounds sloth and inefficiency in large sections of the bureaucracy. In a
competitive world, where trade and
technology have emerged as lethal tools of predation,
something for which mankind earlier resorted to wars, the country can no longer continue with unsatisfactory state of R&D
institutions or larger components of an uncompetitive private sector. Similarly,
the exodus of super- skilled human
capital or flight of natural resources, the poor state of average
health of the population and deficiently skilled
work force, negatively impact the ability to sustain a stronger national
security cover.
While no country can attain or
pursue absolute national security, the vulnerabilities and challenges for India, compared
to its institutional capacities, have continued to expand. These appear unlikely to be bridged by any
tactical initiatives to improve the professional-technical capacity
of existing institutions. One can measure the quality
of national security capacity
of a state by evaluating the sum total
of its institutional capacities to: a) prevent,
pre-empt, and deter real and potential threats – external or internal – without
eroding its long-term strengths; and
b) the ability of these institutions – including their structures and processes as well as larger underlying
values – to optimise the comprehensive national output of
its people. On these criteria, the
world’s biggest democracy and the oldest civilisation has its task well cut out.
NATURE FOR THE PARADIGM SHIFT
A higher quality of human
resources, in terms of stronger physical-cognitive-technical capacities, as well as larger values such as the integrity of industry
and enterprise, have traditionally
constituted the base of the pyramid of national security. Instead of sheer numbers, such attributes reflect the real strength of the population. India’s record is quite alarming
on these parameters, with relatively low life expectancy, high incidence of malnutrition and morbid diseases, impaired cognitive skills and stunted growth of a
large percentage of children, among
others, resulting in physically weaker and deficiently skilled
work force. With poor access
to high quality
technical, professional and life skills, the overall productivity of the country’s
collective human resources
is way below its potential,
diluting the advantage if sheer numbers. Such
challenges appear unlikely to be resolved by the existing free- flowing, and somewhat chaotic dynamics
of markets or the state of existing governance and healthcare institutions.
Simultaneously, disproportionately
larger sections of our productive
human resource appear to have been sucked into
non-productive professions like political activism,
cinema, infotainment, marketing, advertising, public relations, domestic chores and even various others pursuits whose real contribution to tangible economic
power may be suspect. These could be symptoms of a deeper underlying
challenges like extreme inequality,
deficient regulation, and structural imbalances
of the market economy. It will stretch the genius of even the best among Indian economists to find innovative
solutions, going beyond the prevailing theories and
concepts of the market economy,
to facilitate optimally
productive deployment of this
large population.
Simultaneously, the nature of
reforms that we need in the regulatory and enabling capacity
of the state may not have any ready-made parallels. India needs
stronger and sharper capacities to
segregate bona fide corporate
entrepreneurship, to nurture,
protect, encourage and support these in a larger quest for the economic
and technological empowerment of the country. It will have to adopt more innovative approaches and strategies to build its private
sector as a genuine partner in wealth creation,
gainful employment of people as well as major driver of technological innovation and
excellence. This would be difficult
in the absence of larger trust-based social systems that encourage and sustain a wider culture of excellence and integrity-driven leadership. It will test
the leadership abilities of all major
stakeholders of the country to unleash an agenda for transformation of institutions of state and society for this purpose.
Internal cohesion has always
remained the most critical ingredient
of national security. This enables states to handle external threats better. Despite sustained assaults on social harmony, and downsides like caste-based
divisions, India’s cohesive
heterogeneity has remained fairly
robust and resilient. However, the situation could have been better with a robust and efficient criminal justice systems as
well as stronger curbs on abuse of
freedom in this direction. India needs to devise innovative and low-cost
strategies to curb internal fissures, as these erode the capacity of the state to deal with external subversion and aggression. Despite
consistent clandestine efforts
of Pakistani deep state-sponsored networks,
the overwhelming majority
of Indian Muslims
have remained
immune to subversive propaganda and derive
pride from their Indian identity.
However, all identity-driven fissures, including
radicalism in the name of Islam, can be addressed only through combined efforts of the criminal justice system and societal initiatives like persuasion,
communication and social reform.
Subversive radicalism peddled by hostile forces through clandestine global networks needs to be dealt with through exemplary and deterrent coercion.
However, political exploitation of identity divides
has an equally serious negative
impact on internal cohesion.
Coercive actions can deter assaults
on internal cohesion only of these are channelled through a process
of a credible and impartial criminal justice system.
There are large number of studies suggesting that organised subversion – including radicalisation and terrorism – and organised crime thrive and feed on each other. These eventually build a spiral of their own, making it
difficult to differentiate normal
corruption and sponsored subversion. India has to find a more effective
solution to deny space to organised subversive and crime networks which have been flourishing, with the clandestine support of hostile
forces. With strong
pockets of global influence, these clandestine networks,
aided by access to advanced technologies and
ability to operate swiftly and
flexibly, can wield far more influence than is ordinarily visualised. These can potentially subvert
key institutions of state, and
interfere with our democratic governance processes and institutions to the detriment
of our comprehensive national security. In certain situations, these
can virtually paralyse the capacity
of key institutions to defend and protect even the legitimate national interests of a democratic country.
The seriousness of the threat of
subversion to open and democratic
states is manifest in the US allegations of external interference in its electoral
process, as well as other institutions.
Sections of the US media have highlighted this issue,
along with the malicious abuse of the
mechanisms of lobbying, by exploiting
the open nature of their society. It is difficult to fathom the entire
reality in this context, but the vulnerability of even the most
powerful democracy of the world, which boasts
of a comprehensive network of efficient and autonomous institutions with access to most sophisticated
technologies, is evident.
Given the greater fragility
of institutions and intensity of hostility of some of its adversaries, India would be far more vulnerable. Tactical
efficiency like improvements in transparency in
all financial transactions, including electoral funding, or curbs on bureaucratic corruption or effective
deterrents to money
laundering, may be necessary but are probably
insufficient to address
the scale of threat. A comprehensive
restructuring of institutions, to infuse a larger culture of efficiency and integrity, howsoever difficult and utopian it may sound, will have to be
attempted, given the scale of threats.
CONCLUSION
India, at this juncture of history,
faces a predicament that probably very
few major powers or civilisations have faced.
Its potentials and opportunities to rise as a major global power are entwined with formidable challenges.
There is massive domestic aspiration
as well as wider international support for the rise of a democratic and heterogenous India, which can be
the biggest antidote to both Islamic radicalism as well as opaque authoritarianism. But there are
serious internal and external
impediments in this direction. Besides, global cliques and cartels, as well as the rough and tumble of a globalised world, create uncertainties and threats within which large
sections of India’s own political, corporate,
bureaucratic as well as other elite,
may be uncomfortable with the idea of transformational changes.
Many of them have thrived
and flourished in an
ecosystem of fragile institutions and a shift
towards competition, transparency and meritocracy may result in loss of privileges and advantages to
entrenched sections of the elites.
China’s spectacular governance accomplishments have raised serious
doubts about the efficacy of the existing
democratic governance institutions to transform the plight of people in post-colonial states. This is
especially given the relative decline
in governance capacities of even the advanced
democracies of the West. Chinese
scholars often claim that the West was able to establish its
comprehensive material, intellectual
and technological superiority largely due to the colonial moorings of its early prosperity, which provided the foundation for subsequent innovations, industry and enterprise. China claims to have built its prosperity and technological modernisation through sheer strength
of its civilisational values and governance model, which it describes as more meritocratic, encouraging greater
industry and enterprise.
India’s societal ethos has
retained its essentially humanist, plural andtransparent nature, despite all pressures and distortions or degenerations, reversed by phases of
resurrection. This is what explains
the sustenance of democracy in India even under adverse circumstances. Any drift towards
authoritarianism is likely to
seriously erode its capacity and output as a nation, and hence will be counter-productive for its national security objectives. At this stage,
the country has to explore
refinements of some of its key institutions, ranging from political parties to civil
services, criminal justice
system, corporate sector,
media, civil society
entities, institutions of higher research, health-
care, the elementary education regime, among others, to bolster collective national output. This will be crucial for building and sustaining a stronger national
security architecture, capable
of pursuing robust
and innovative strategies. To improve the quality of output of each of these
institutions, as well as their
contribution to national power, they need to be equipped with credible norms, values and procedures to promote skill and merit-driven performance as well as a
culture of genuine leadership, which
can continuously optimise the quality of their output.
Political, bureaucratic or even corporate rent, or entitlement
driven privileges or hereditary leadership, is a luxury that no dynamic democracy can afford within
any of its institutions, including political parties or larger
corporate organisations. India will have to spearhead
democratic innovations in this direction
to protect its core national
security interests.
Democracies can potentially create far superior
governance institutions than authoritarian states,
provided they can marshal their
basic principles to build a stronger synergy
between individual and
institutional excellence, where both drive each other. India has to explore an integrated and yet dynamic framework of high-quality governance and
social institutions, where each enjoys autonomy
and independence at one level,
to optimally grow and evolve, and yet be able to collaborate with the others. This is possible with
suitable safeguards as well as larger instruments of functional complementarity and a culture
of integrity that enables swift and decisive
responses. The challenges towards such a transition would be huge. But it is
time to embark on a journey in this direction.
